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The Limits of Aesthetic Empiricism
Fabian Dorsch
4.1 Introduction: Aesthetic Empiricism
No sensible account of aesthetic appreciation can deny that empirical evidence is central 
to the understanding and appraisal of artworks. This remains true even if empirical access 
is broadly understood as to comprise not only sensory perception, but also emotional 
experience and scientific observation, as well as their testimonial dissemination. We have 
to make use of our senses in order to get to know artworks, including works of literature 
or conceptual art. We have to pay attention to our feelings in response to artworks in order 
to assess whether they are moving or tragic. We have to determine the age of artworks and 
study the circumstances of their production in order to uncover their degree of originality 
and imaginativeness. And our aesthetic appreciation of art always involves the empirical 
interaction with concrete entities—even in the case of literature, music, or conceptual art, 
say. Accordingly, our knowledge of aesthetic properties is invariably empirical in the sense 
that it is at least partially based on our empirical access to the artworks concerned.
This concession to empirically minded views in aesthetics leaves, however, room 
for legitimate disagreement about the concrete extent of the epistemic role of empiri-
cal evidence in aesthetic appreciation. Roughly speaking, while aesthetic empiricism 
maintains that empirical evidence may—and often does—suffice to provide defeasible 
justification for our first- or higher-order aesthetic judgements, aesthetic rationalism 
denies this.1 More specifically, three particular empiricist claims—which differ pri-
marily in the kind of judgement that they take empirical evidence to possess the power 
to ground—are the subject of controversy:
 (E1)  Empirical evidence can be sufficient to defeasibly justify aesthetic judge-
ments (e.g., ‘the painting is beautiful’).
 1 Aesthetic empiricists also sometimes defend the stronger claim that empirical evidence is the canon-
ical or even the sole source of justification. But what they typically have in mind when making this claim is 
first-personal experience, rather than scientific or otherwise third-personal evidence—see, for instance, Sibley 
(1965/2001) and Budd (1999) on judgements about aesthetic qualities, or Goldman (1995) and Budd (1996) on 
judgements about aesthetic values. I object to this stronger empiricist claim in Dorsch (2007) and Dorsch (2014).
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 (E2)  Empirical evidence can be sufficient to defeasibly justify judgements about 
the adequacy of our aesthetic judgements (e.g., ‘I am justified in judging that 
the painting is beautiful’).
 (E3)  Empirical evidence can be sufficient to defeasibly justify sceptical judge-
ments about our capacity to form adequate aesthetic judgements (e.g., ‘I am 
an unreliable critic and should refrain from forming aesthetic judgements’).
In this chapter, I would like to argue that none of these three empiricist claims is true. 
With respect to (E1), it makes a difference whether the kind of justification concerned 
is assumed to be non-inferential or inferential. I have elsewhere argued against the 
idea that perceptual, emotional, and other first-personal experiences can provide 
non-inferential justification for aesthetic judgements (see Dorsch 2007 and 2014). 
Accordingly, my present consideration of the non-inferential reading of (E1) is exclu-
sively focused on the possibility of non-inferential justification through third-personal 
empirical evidence, as it is provided by the natural sciences, the examination of histori-
cal sources, or sociological or psychological studies. My arguments against the infer-
ential reading of (E1), as well as against the other two empiricist claims, are largely 
neutral on whether the empirical evidence concerned is first- or third-personal. But 
since (E2) and (E3) are generally more plausible if applied to third-personal evidence, 
my discussion of aesthetic empiricism in this chapter is primarily concentrated on evi-
dence provided by scientific or similar studies.2
4.2 Grounding Aesthetic Judgements: (E1)
Let us begin with the issue of whether (E1) is true: whether empirical evidence can pro-
vide epistemic support for the ascription of aesthetic properties to artworks. In fact, 
empirical research may lead to the discovery of properties of a certain kind in a direct 
or in an indirect way.
The empirical detection of properties is direct if the empirically gained evidence 
informs us about their presence without the need to engage in any type of inference 
or reasoning. For example, we can directly see the colour of material objects, or use 
instruments to directly measure (i.e., read off) their length or size. With respect to 
aesthetic appreciation, the idea is that we can see or measure the symmetry of a build-
ing, or discover the value of a piece of music by feeling the pleasure that it gives us (see, 
e.g., Sibley 1965/2001, McDowell 1983, and Kieran 2010). In such cases, the empirical 
evidence grounds our aesthetic judgements in a non-inferential way.
 2 It has been proposed that there are higher-order epistemic feelings which reflect the good (or bad) 
epistemic standing of first-order states (see Proust 2008). While I am generally sympathetic to this idea 
(see Dorsch 2009b and Dorsch 2013), I am not sure whether these feelings can provide justification for the 
relevant higher-order judgements. In any case, a positive answer would concern the truth of (E2) just for 
first-personal—but not for third-personal—evidence.
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The empirical discernment of properties is indirect, on the other hand, if the respec-
tive experiments and studies merely enable us to infer their presence by registering 
features of another kind and by establishing suitable specific principles of inference. 
Spectrophotometry, for instance, provides us with indirect access to surface colours 
by directly measuring reflectance profiles and by recording correlations between 
such profiles and colour experiences (see Hardin 1988, Byrne and Hilbert 2003, and 
Dorsch 2009a). Applied to aesthetic judgement, the thought is that we can infer the 
aesthetic value or qualities of artworks on the basis of the empirical discovery of both 
their non-aesthetic features and the metaphysical connections between the two sets of 
properties. In such cases, the empirical evidence provides us with inferential justifica-
tion for our aesthetic judgements.
4.2.1 Non-inferential grounding
According to a standard picture, aesthetic values are realized by aesthetic qualities, 
which are again realized by non-aesthetic properties (see, e.g., Sibley 1965/2001 and 
1959/2001, Budd 1999, and Zangwill 2001). On the assumption that realization is tran-
sitive, aesthetic values are also realized by the non-aesthetic features. But, due to the 
hierarchical structure of realization, the realization by non-aesthetic features occurs 
on a lower level than the realization by aesthetic qualities.
Empirical investigation can certainly disclose in a direct manner many of the 
non-aesthetic features of aesthetically valuable objects that are relevant for the reali-
zation of aesthetic qualities or values. We can use tools to measure the size or age of 
artworks; learn about the circumstances of their creation, social function, curatorial 
treatment, or monetary value by reading historical sources that explicitly describe 
them; detect their underlying pentimenti by means of X-ray images, or their imper-
ceivable molecular structure by means of chemical analysis; employ the various 
brain-imaging methods of the cognitive sciences to record their emotional or other 
effects on people; or simply observe the normal reaction of artworks on people (e.g., 
whether they enrage them, or move them to tears).
By contrast, whether something is elegant, unified, beautiful, or a masterpiece, say, 
is not a measurable quantity (see Budd 1999: 303). We cannot discover the graceful-
ness or aesthetic worth of an artwork by means of chemical analysis, X-ray spectro-
microscopy, or other scientific tools. Similarly, we cannot determine the harmony or 
sublimity of a work by means of financial appraisal or the interpretation of historical 
documents. In other words, while empirical investigations have developed methods of 
detecting many of the non-aesthetic features of objects, they generally do not offer the 
same kind of direct empirical access to aesthetic properties (irrespective of whether 
they are evaluative or qualitative).
This difference in empirical access is a consequence of the fact that aesthetic prop-
erties are generally response-dependent:  that is, their instantiation depends not 
only on the presence of suitable lower-level realizers, but also on how we normally 
respond to the recognition of those realizers. Objects are red, for instance, because 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Jan 31 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199669639.indd   77 1/31/2014   6:56:13 PM
78 Dorsch
their reflectance profile is such that, if perceptually registered, causes a specific kind 
of experience (i.e., a ‘red experience’) in suitable subjects under suitable conditions 
(see Wright 1994: ch. 3 and Dorsch 2009a). Similarly, objects are harmonious or excel-
lent because their lower-level features, when experientially or otherwise noticed, cause 
corresponding aesthetic judgements in suitable critics under suitable circumstances 
(see Hume 1757/2008, Goldman 1995, and Budd 1996). Hence, empirically registering 
the respective underlying features does not suffice to reveal the colour or aesthetic fea-
ture of an object. What is also needed is to inferentially link the two kinds of property.
In addition, direct empirical access to aesthetic properties is also ruled out by the 
fact that they are typically normative: they are either values, or by default linked to 
values in such a way as to constitute reasons for evaluation. It is certainly no easy task 
to specify what the normativity of a feature consists in. But it seems to be a satisfactory 
minimal characterization to say that normative features are constitutively linked to 
norms, that is, to principles which may be violated by the entities that are governed 
by them (see Korsgaard 1997/2008). Bearers of aesthetic value are subject to the norm 
that they should be aesthetically good rather than aesthetically bad. This is part of what 
it means to possess some aesthetic value. Equally, subjects responsive to reasons for 
aesthetic judgements are governed by the norm that they ought to conform to such 
reasons once they have recognized them. Again, this is part of what it means to be 
rational. But, in both cases, the respective entities may fail to live up to the normative 
standards. Artworks may be aesthetically bad and the aesthetic responses of subjects 
irrational.
Now, empirical investigations are exclusively concerned with principles (such as the 
strict or ceteris paribus laws of physics) that do not allow for their infringement by enti-
ties that are governed by them. If a counter-example to an empirical principle is found, 
then the principle turns out to be false and needs to be revised or given up.3 Hence, 
empirical studies are, by their very nature, not in the business of detecting or estab-
lishing norms. But this has the consequence that they also cannot register aesthetic 
values or identify non-evaluative features—such as aesthetic qualities—as reasons 
for aesthetic evaluation. For, given that values and reasons are constitutively linked to 
norms, they cannot be discerned independently of the latter or, more generally, of their 
normative dimension. The only kind of empirical access, that the normative aspect of 
aesthetic properties need not exclude, is the registration of the presence of aesthetic 
qualities without their recognition as reasons.
The fact that we cannot decide by empirical means whether a given feature is an 
aesthetic reason and, if it is, which aesthetic judgement or evaluation it is a reason for 
leads naturally to the idea that the recognition of which features are rationally relevant, 
and in which way they are rationally relevant, requires engagement in some form of 
 3 Note that not only strict laws but also ceteris paribus laws are exceptionless in this sense. The latter 
merely allow for intervening factors, but not for counter-examples. By contrast, moral laws, say, are not 
rendered invalid simply because people breach them.
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rational response or reasoning. Of course, relevant empirical investigations may reveal 
to us which features we actually (rightly or wrongly) take to be aesthetic reasons; and 
I return to this option in section 4.3. Also, they may direct our attention to features of 
artworks that we were previously unaware of, and which happen to constitute aesthetic 
reasons. But by doing this, they do not mark them as reason-constituting features. It is 
still up to us and our rational capacities to recognize them as reasons, and not merely as 
the features or the realizers of aesthetic properties that they are.
4.2.2 Inferential Grounding
The conclusion that empirical evidence cannot provide us with non-inferential justifi-
cation for aesthetic judgements still leaves open the possibility of the empirical provi-
sion of inferential justification for such judgements. This possibility presupposes that 
we are able to infer the presence of aesthetic properties from the presence of (some of) 
their non-aesthetic realizers by means of some suitable metaphysical principles or laws 
linking the aesthetic properties to their underlying realizers.4 But it also requires that 
the discovery of both the non-aesthetic features and the metaphysical principles hap-
pens by empirical means. Otherwise, the inferential justification provided would not 
count as empirical, at least not in the interesting sense captured by aesthetic empiri-
cism. This is already reflected in the fact that (E1) maintains that empirical evidence 
can be sufficient for the justification of aesthetic judgements. For empirical evidence 
suffices to provide inferential justification only if it gives us access not only to the 
non-aesthetic features that make up the inferential base, but also to the principles of 
inference that allow us to reason from those non-aesthetic features to the aesthetic 
properties concerned.
Indeed, if aesthetic empiricism would just require the possibility of empirical 
knowledge of the non-aesthetic features, it would not be in disagreement with aes-
thetic rationalism, at least not in any meaningful way. For, as already noted, it is unde-
niable that empirical investigations can reveal the presence of most (if not all) relevant 
non-aesthetic features, such as colours, textures, sounds, and so on. Aesthetic ration-
alism should thus agree with aesthetic empiricism that we enjoy empirical access to 
the non-aesthetic properties of artworks. But this should not be surprising, given 
the fact—mentioned at the beginning of this chapter—that aesthetic knowledge is 
always at least partially based on empirical evidence. What the two views really dif-
fer about is, instead, whether empirical evidence can ground our further knowledge 
that the empirically detected non-aesthetic features constitute the inferential basis for 
some aesthetic judgements. But recognizing non-aesthetic features as inferential rea-
sons means recognizing them as figuring in the antecedents of relevant principles of 
inference. As a result, the disagreement between aesthetic empiricism and aesthetic 
 4 The following discussion focuses on deductive principles, but the same should be true of principles of 
induction (e.g., ‘if all seen swans are white, then all swans are white’) and perhaps also principles of abduc-
tion (‘what best explains our observations of the planets’ movements is that they move around the sun’).
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rationalism ultimately concerns the issue of whether we can acquire, on empirical 
grounds, knowledge of inferential principles that link non-aesthetic to aesthetic prop-
erties. Aesthetic empiricism says yes, aesthetic rationalism says no.
In other words, the disagreement is about the nature of the inferential extension of 
aesthetic knowledge (if such an extension is possible at all). When we correctly infer 
the presence of one set of properties from the presence of another set of properties, we 
extend our knowledge. Prior to the inference, we merely know of the instantiation of 
one set of properties. Afterwards, we also know of the instantiation of the other. Now, 
whether this extension of knowledge is empirical depends on the nature of our justifi-
cation for the inferential move. This justification is, again, a matter of two factors: our 
justification to reason in accordance with the relevant general pattern of inference 
(e.g., modus ponens); and our justification to use the relevant principle of inference 
(e.g., that the presence of one set of properties entails, or renders very likely, the pres-
ence of the other set of properties). The reasonableness of relying on the general pat-
tern of inferences is not something that can be proven empirically (see Wright 2004 
and Ramsey 1926/1931, respectively). Hence, the inferential extension of knowledge is 
empirical only if our justification for believing the principle of inference is empirical.
Compare the analogous case of the empirical recognition of surface colours. We 
can empirically test which colour a given surface possesses by measuring its reflec-
tance profile—that is, the physical property that realizes its colour—and establishing 
and applying the relevant laws of colour science which link such profiles to colours. 
Reflectance profiles are not identical with colour properties since they are unable to fix 
all qualitative aspects of colour, such as the location of unique hues (see Allen 2010) or 
the colour similarities across surface, volume and light colours (see Dorsch 2010a). But 
they nonetheless count as realizing colours and enable us to predict the latter, given 
that they determine the hue, brightness, and saturation of surface colours (see Byrne 
and Hilbert 2003 and Dorsch 2010a). For example, experiments tell us that red sur-
faces reflect light with a long wavelength to a higher degree than light with a middle 
or a short wavelength (relative to the band of wavelengths which our eyes are sensitive 
to; see McCann, McKee, and Taylor 1976: 456 and Hardin 1988). The resulting strict 
principles of the form ‘if a surface possesses the reflectance profile P, then it possesses 
colour C’ may then be used to decide the colour of a surface on the basis of its meas-
ured reflectance profile. Hence, there is a third-personal empirical alternative to col-
our experience: we can come to know about the colour of surfaces, not only by looking 
at them, but also by carrying out experiments in optical physics that register the reflec-
tance profiles of surfaces and discover their correlations to colours (see Dorsch 2014).
The question is now whether something similar might be true of aesthetic proper-
ties: whether we can come to know the aesthetic value or qualities of an artwork by 
measuring its non-aesthetic features and linking them, by means of empirically uncov-
ered metaphysical principles, to certain aesthetic properties. As already acknowl-
edged, empirical investigations can indeed inform us about many of the non-aesthetic 
features of artworks. So, the applicability of the inferential strategy to the aesthetic case 
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depends on whether we enjoy suitable empirical access to the metaphysical connec-
tions between aesthetic and non-aesthetic features. In the case of colours, the infer-
ential strategy is feasible because reflectance profiles are strictly correlated to colours, 
and because the colour sciences are able to reveal these correlations. But—with two 
notable exceptions to be discussed further below—useful metaphysical principles are 
generally unavailable in the aesthetic case, especially if they are meant to be established 
empirically and to capture correlations between aesthetic properties and underlying 
non-aesthetic features that are open to empirical discernment. Hence, while we can 
normally deduce the colour of a surface from its other features (e.g., its reflectance pro-
file), we typically cannot do the same with the unity or beauty of an artwork.
4.2.3 The unavailability of aesthetic principles
The main reason for the general lack of useful aesthetic principles linking aesthetic 
to non-aesthetic features is that—with the two exceptions already mentioned—the 
antecedents of the available aesthetic principles are too specific for the principles to 
be meaningfully employed in the appreciation of artworks. Indeed, there are three 
different factors that are responsible for the specificity of the antecedents of aesthetic 
principles.
The first factor is aesthetic holism: the fact that whether, and how, a feature contrib-
utes to the realization of an aesthetic property depends on which other features are 
present.
Aesthetic holism becomes apparent in the fact that both aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
lower-level features may vary in their contribution to the higher-level aesthetic prop-
erties of their bearers. For example, while many works constitute successful art partly 
in virtue of including elegant elements (e.g., drawings by Matisse), others may to some 
extent be aesthetic failures precisely because of their involvement of elegance (e.g., to 
use Dickie’s (2004: 412) example, a rustic play in which some of the lines or dresses of 
the characters are too elegant). Similarly, the tragic intensity of an artwork may con-
tribute negatively to its aesthetic value if it is (unintentionally) combined with comic 
elements—even if this requires the nullification or reversal of an otherwise positive 
impact of tragic intensity (see Sibley 1983/2001, as well as the discussion of default mer-
its and defects in section 4.2.4).
The best explanation of this variability is that the contribution of a particular aes-
thetic or non-aesthetic feature to some higher-level aesthetic property depends 
in part on the other aesthetically relevant features of the object in question. That is, 
the realization of a given aesthetic property is a matter not only of the mere sum of 
the relevant lower-level properties, but also of their complex interactions with each 
other. However, aesthetic holism has the consequence that the antecedents of aesthetic 
principles—whether linking non-aesthetic to aesthetic properties or aesthetic quali-
ties to aesthetic values—have to be very specific by mentioning (almost) all respective 
lower-level properties of the artwork.
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The second factor is that aesthetic properties depend on determinate non-aesthetic 
features, such as most specific shapes, colours, sequences of words, cultural contexts, and 
so on. A slight change in the curvature of the shape of a vase, for instance, may under-
mine its elegance and, as a result, also its beauty. As Sibley has noted, this is why we can 
at best get principles of the form ‘if a vase possesses this most specific shape, then it is 
elegant and beautiful’, but not principles of the form ‘if a vase possesses a determinable 
shape that this most specific shape is a determination of, then it is elegant and beautiful’.5
Malcolm Budd has rightly pointed out that not all minute alterations in determi-
nate non-aesthetic properties lead to an alteration in aesthetic quality or value.6 But 
this undermines Sibley’s argument only if the effectual and the non-effectual changes 
bring about determinations of different determinables—which is not guaranteed to be 
often the case. For Sibley’s point is that there can be an aesthetic principle connecting 
a determinable non-aesthetic property to an aesthetic value only if all determinations 
of that determinable are linked to that value. Hence, his opponents have to ensure that 
all slight changes that lead to the exemplification of a different value, also lead to the 
instantiation of a different determinable. Sibley’s example is precisely meant to ques-
tion the viability of this strong thesis.
The third factor is that at least some instantiations of aesthetic value depend on the 
numerical identity of the event of creation concerned, which again depends on the 
numerical identity of the involved artist, point of time, and so on. This happens, for 
instance, in cases where the particularity of artistic expression is aesthetically relevant. 
Artworks may not only be expressive of perspectives on the world, that is, represent 
the values, emotions, and opinions of (real or fictional) persons or characters. They are 
also always expressions of the skills of the respective artist—of his or her insight, inven-
tiveness, wit, sensibility, unoriginality, or dilettantism. Part of why we value artworks 
is that they are expressive of the specific artistic skills and virtues of a particular artist 
at a given time (see McGonigal 2010 and Kieran 2010). Even if I happen by chance to 
come up with a simple line drawing that resembles those made by Matisse, my drawing 
will be of lesser aesthetic value, given that it is a fortuitous achievement, rather than a 
manifestation of artistic mastery. But artistic expression is, again, partly a matter of the 
particularity of the artist and his or her act of expression, given that it is an instance of 
the genuine expression of a particular person’s personal features (e.g., traits, skills, or 
thoughts).7 For instance, it matters for the aesthetic value of a given Cubistic painting 
 5 See Sibley (1959/2001) and (1974/2001). It is no counter-example to this claim that, say, Hamlet would 
remain eloquent and a masterpiece even if whole scenes were missing. For it would be an eloquent master-
piece of a different kind, with a different aesthetic value realized by different aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
properties.
 6 See Budd (1999: 302–3). Note that Budd is not opposing Sibley’s conclusion, but just his argument for 
that conclusion. Indeed, he accepts Sibley’s observations about aesthetic principles (see Budd 1999: 301), but 
does not offer his own reasons for doing so.
 7 See, for instance, McDowell (1982). In particular, genuine expression is factive: it is expressive of some-
thing existing or obtaining. Facial expression and much of linguistic expression are also genuine in this 
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whether it was made in Céret in 1911 and, if so, whether it was created by Braque or by 
Picasso. Hence, the relevant aesthetic principles have to mention particular individu-
als in their antecedents.
The noted specificity of the antecedents of aesthetic principles—that is, their involve-
ment of a large number of very determinate properties and possibly also of some indi-
viduals—has three important consequences.
First, aesthetic principles are largely inapplicable: there are at best a few objects that 
actually satisfy their antecedents. Possible examples are paintings which are almost 
identical in their physical, representational, and historical properties—such as the 
various paintings with exactly the same subject matter produced by the Brueghel 
workshop. However, the physical objects concerned can count as satisfying the 
same aesthetic principle only if they are assumed to constitute distinct artworks. But 
perhaps such serially (though manually) produced objects should be treated more 
like prints in that they are all copies of one and the same repeatable artwork (see 
Currie 1989).
Second, aesthetic principles are practically unspecifiable: the number of the relevant 
non-aesthetic features or aesthetic qualities is just too large, and the non-aesthetic 
properties are also often too specific, to allow for their precise and exhaustive descrip-
tion. Just consider the task of describing the exact configuration of colours and shapes 
on particular paintings by Monet or Kandinsky.
Third, aesthetic principles are mostly uninformative: they do not go beyond express-
ing a very general supervenience claim. There are at least two dimensions to this unin-
formativity of specific aesthetic principles. On the one hand, they do not pick out any 
recognizable and describable pattern among the various sets of features that realize 
one and the same aesthetic property. There are different ways in which artworks may 
be graceful or sublime. But, due to their specificity, the corresponding principles do 
not manage to identify any similarities between those ways (see Jackson, Pettit, and 
Smith 2004). On the other hand, the specific aesthetic principles under consideration 
do not discriminate between the features that are highly relevant and those that are 
hardly relevant for the aesthetic properties mentioned in the consequent. For instance, 
they treat the dimensions of a canvas on a par with the texture of the paint brushes or 
the shapes of drawn lines, although the weight and significance of their contribution 
to the realization or the explanation of aesthetic properties may differ greatly. Indeed, 
the principles at issue may very well cite non-aesthetic properties or aesthetic qualities 
that are, with respect to the particular artwork in question, not at all aesthetically rel-
evant as realizers or reasons.
Because of the restrictions on our capacity to formulate highly specific principles, 
it is questionable whether we really enjoy access to very many aesthetic principles 
sense. The factive expression of artistic skills has, however, to be distinguished from other, non-factive forms 
of expression involved in art, such as the expression of emotions through music, or the expression of a char-
acter’s state of mind by an actor.
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that capture the metaphysical connections between aesthetic and non-aesthetic fea-
tures. Furthermore, even if it is possible for us to describe some such correlations in 
law-like terms, it is natural to doubt whether they should count as genuine principles, 
on account of the limitations to their generality, applicability, and informativity. At 
least, they are not the kind of principles, the availability and usefulness of which is 
at issue in the debate between generalists and particularists (see Jackson, Pettit, and 
Smith 2004). This is reflected by the fact that very complex and determinate aesthetic 
principles play no notable role in actual instances of aesthetic criticism. Accordingly, 
even if empirical investigations succeed in discovering something like highly specific 
aesthetic principles, this should not count as a substantial contribution to criticism. 
In particular, these principles cannot in practice be used to infer aesthetic properties 
from non-aesthetic ones.
4.2.4 Conceptual and default principles
However, as noted above, there are two kinds of aesthetic principle that are relatively 
general and, as a result, relevant and useful for aesthetic criticism. But while they allow 
for the justification of aesthetic judgements by means of principled inferences, these 
principles are not empirically accessible.
Exceptions of the first kind—so-called conceptual principles—arise because of 
certain logical connections between evaluative and non-evaluative concepts, which 
generate corresponding and conceptually true principles. Arguably, that something 
is symmetrical logically implies that it is balanced: that is, it is inconceivable that 
something symmetrical is imbalanced, in the same sense in which it is inconceiv-
able that a bachelor is married. Accordingly, since we can scientifically measure 
whether something (e.g., a face or a building) is symmetrical, we have also indirect 
access to the aesthetic quality of being balanced and—given that this property is 
by default linked to a positive aesthetic value—perhaps also to some instances of 
aesthetic worth.
Conceptual principles are very limited in number, however. Indeed, not many other 
examples come easily to mind. Perhaps being original—in the sense of being the first—
is another aesthetic quality that is logically entailed by some measurable non-aesthetic 
feature, namely position in time relative to other artworks. More important, such con-
ceptual principles are irrelevant for the issue under consideration, given that we know 
them a priori and not a posteriori. Of course, we may test our various conceptual intui-
tions and the extent to which they are commonly accepted—but not which of them are 
indeed adequate and do track conceptual necessities. The main reason for this is that 
the conditions on conceptual competence are of a normative nature and thus resist 
empirical specification (see Kripke 1982 and Hale 1997).8 Because of their conceptual 
truth, principles of the kind at issue are therefore not open to empirical discovery.
 8 Even some of the strongest defenders of experimental methods in philosophy acknowledge that such 
methods are not—and should not be—aimed at discovering conceptual links (see Knobe and Nichols 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Jan 31 2014, NEWGEN
acprof-9780199669639.indd   84 1/31/2014   6:56:14 PM
The Limits of Aesthetic Empiricism 85
The second exceptional class consists of what may be labelled default principles: that 
is, principles that capture the positive or negative default contribution of certain features 
to aesthetic value. It is important to note that aesthetic holism does not prevent aesthetic 
qualities from being default merits or defects.9 For instance, being balanced or being 
graceful contribute, by default, positively to their bearer’s aesthetic worth; while being 
garish or being sentimental have, by default, the opposite effect. It is open to debate 
what it means exactly that certain features are by default merit- or defect-constituting 
properties (see, e.g., Bergqvist 2010). But the default character of the property of being 
balanced, say, becomes manifest in the fact that judgements like ‘it is beautiful because it 
is balanced’ need no further epistemic justification or metaphysical explanation, while 
judgements like ‘it is ugly because it is balanced’ do if they are not to remain unintelligi-
ble (see Sibley 1983/2001: 106, Bergqvist 2010: 11, and Kirwin 2011: 209).10
However, the role of empirical investigations in the establishment of default prin-
ciples—principles like ‘something elegant is, by default, beautiful’ or ‘tragic intensity 
constitutes, by default, an aesthetic merit’—is, again, very limited. Neither the obtaining 
of their antecedents nor that of their consequents can be established directly by scien-
tific means, given that aesthetic properties are not open to non-inferential empirical 
access. Equally, it is not possible to empirically decide which features are default merits 
or default defects, and which not. It might be proposed that we can find out whether a 
certain feature is a default merit by noting that ascriptions of that feature are more often 
than not followed by a positive evaluation. But empirical investigations do not have the 
resources to tell which of the recorded responses are in fact adequate and which should 
instead be discounted as flawed (see the discussion in section 4.3). However, if empirical 
studies cannot distinguish adequate from flawed aesthetic responses, they cannot use 
their results to determine whether certain features are, indeed, default merits or defects.
Moreover, even if it were somehow possible to empirically discern the adequacy 
of expressed aesthetic opinions, this would not help much with the establishment of 
default principles, mainly because of two problems related to aesthetic holism.
The first problem is that aesthetic qualities are hardly ever so isolated in their occur-
rence that they contribute to aesthetic value independently of the influence of other 
2008: section 1). The same conclusion can also be found in the more rationalist approaches of Bealer (2002) 
and Chalmers (2002).
 9 I borrow this terminology from Bergqvist (2010), who in turn has borrowed it from Dancy (2004). 
Other writers talk of ‘inherent’ or ‘prima facie’ merits and defects (see Sibley 1983/2001, Budd 1999, and 
Bender 1995).
 10 Perhaps this fact is best explained in terms of the idea that it is distinctive of default merits that they are 
able to make a positive contribution to aesthetic value without the help of other features, while they need 
such help when making a negative contribution, or no contribution at all (Bergqvist 2010: 11). This idea 
would also be able to capture the further idea that default merits give rise to a positive value when occurring 
in isolation or, more realistically, in the absence of any interference by other features (see Bergqvist 2010 for 
critical discussion); as well as the idea that default merits render it perhaps more probable than not that their 
bearers are of positive aesthetic worth.
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aesthetic qualities. But if there are almost no actual manifestations of default contribu-
tion, they cannot be properly studied by empirical means. If empirical studies could, 
after all, show that the large majority of elegant artworks are in fact beautiful, say, this 
would not mean that elegance is a default merit, but at best that various combinations 
of elegance with other aesthetic qualities—which, moreover, need not be the same in 
each case—lead to a positive aesthetic value.
The second problem is that, even if there were many instances of default contribu-
tions to aesthetic value by a single aesthetic quality, empirical findings should not be 
expected to be able to distinguish them from cases in which several aesthetic quali-
ties together determine the aesthetic value of the artwork concerned. The reason 
for this is that empirical research typically cannot reveal, with respect to particular 
artworks, to which extent each of its aesthetic qualities is involved in the realization 
of aesthetic value. And this is, again, due to the fact that their aesthetic relevance is a 
matter of their concrete interaction with each other in each of the examples.
4.2.5 Outlook
The preceding considerations have shown that (E1) is false because empirical evidence 
can justify aesthetic judgements neither non-inferentially, nor inferentially. In partic-
ular, empirical evidence cannot be used to establish principles of inference with suf-
ficient generality that entitle us to infer aesthetic properties from non-aesthetic ones, 
given that such principles concern either conceptual truths or default contributions to 
aesthetic value, neither of which is open to empirical detection.
By contrast, all empirically based aesthetic principles are so specific that they remain 
uninformative with respect to particular aesthetic properties and cannot be applied to 
more than a few instances of aesthetic qualities—if the principles can be formulated 
in the first place. As a result, they are not the kind of principles that may be used to 
infer the aesthetic properties of artworks on the basis of their non-aesthetic features. 
So, at best, empirical studies may inform us about some non-aesthetic features, which 
we then recognize to be rationally relevant within the context of non-deductive and 
largely unprincipled aesthetic reasoning.
But empirical insight might still serve in a different epistemic function with respect to aes-
thetic appreciation. Instead of informing us about the nature of artworks and similar objects, 
it may instead inform us about our own aesthetic responses. More specifically, it may speak 
for or against the epistemic adequacy of specific aesthetic judgements; or it may speak for or 
against our general trustworthiness as aesthetic judges. While the first option concerns the 
truth of (E2), the second concerns the truth of (E3). I discuss each of them in turn.
4.3 Grounding Higher-Order Judgements of 
Adequacy: (E2)
With respect to (E2), the central idea is that there is perhaps an even more indirect 
way in which empirical investigations might be able to identify the aesthetic values 
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or reason-constituting aesthetic qualities of artworks, or disclose which features of 
artworks constitute default merits or defects. Consider, again, the analogous case of 
surface colour. Our empirical access to them need not involve any investigation of the 
properties of the surface concerned. Instead, we may simply study the colour responses 
of a suitably large number of subjects—for instance, by showing them sample objects 
and recording their colour judgements, or scanning the relevant areas of their brains. 
In this way, without ever having to look at the objects or otherwise examine them, 
we may be able to come to know their surface colours. Similarly, art historians and 
cognitive scientists may try to identify the aesthetic properties of an artwork by gain-
ing insight into the aesthetic opinions of people, or their tendencies to form certain 
aesthetic judgements. Artists, critics, curators, and patrons have expressed their 
assessments and preferences in interviews, letters, diaries, and so on, that are open to 
interpretative study; while psychological research may test how people are inclined to 
react evaluatively to given artworks.
However, such investigations disclose what people believe or value, and not what 
is true or valuable. The recognition of the actual properties of the objects in question 
requires also the ability to tell which of the registered judgements (and other forms 
of expression of opinion) are adequate. Part of the reason for this is that the pres-
ence of real property instances—even if they concern response-dependent proper-
ties—is not a matter of the statistical distribution of responses. Even a large number 
or majority of subjects may err about the colours or aesthetic properties of objects 
(see Wright 1994: ch. 3, appendix). This is all the more true in the aesthetic case, 
given that aesthetic appreciation requires a sophisticated form of sensitivity and 
responsiveness which, moreover, is not innate, but needs considerable training (see 
Kant 1790/2009 and Sibley 1959/2001). The violent expressions of anger and disgust 
towards Stravinsky’s Sacre de Printemps at its Parisian premiere, say, are a case in 
point: many members of the audience were simply not (yet) able to appreciate the 
work for what it is.
There are basically two ways in which we might empirically test the adequacy of 
aesthetic judgements.
The first alternative is to try to reproduce the opinions concerned by independent 
means, notably by scrutinizing the underlying features of the artwork in question and 
determining their contribution to aesthetic worth. The idea is that the original opin-
ions to be assessed are adequate just in case they match the independently formed 
judgements. But, as the considerations in section 4.2 have shown, empirical findings 
cannot really provide this kind of access to aesthetic properties.
The second way is to investigate the conditions under which the recorded judge-
ments have actually been formed. The thought is that sufficiently normal or suitable 
conditions indicate adequacy of opinion and insufficiently normal or suitable con-
ditions inadequacy of opinion (again, especially, though not exclusively, if the prop-
erties concerned are response-dependent). The pursuit of this strategy requires us, 
minimally, when faced with disagreeing judgements, to determine which of them are 
at fault.
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In the case of colours, this means simply checking the illumination conditions and 
the state of mind—and, especially, of the visual system—of the persons concerned. If 
a colour judgement is formed under coloured or insufficiently bright lighting, or by a 
subject who is detected to be colour blind or wearing tinted glasses, then it should not 
be considered as representing the true colour of the object concerned. Given that we 
have empirical access to whether normal or suitable conditions for colour perception 
obtain, we can typically find out, on the basis of empirical evidence, whether given col-
our judgements are adequate or not. Similar considerations are likely to apply to most 
other non-aesthetic features of artworks.
In the case of aesthetic qualities and, especially, values, the situation is more com-
plicated. The recognition of aesthetic properties is (nearly) always facilitated by the 
recognition of the underlying non-aesthetic features. For this reason, a person with 
impaired vision is not in a good position to recognize the aesthetic properties of paint-
ings; and a blind person, in no such position at all. Hence, aesthetic judgements can be 
inadequate simply because they are based on inadequate non-aesthetic judgements. 
But since we can empirically discover the presence of judgements of the latter kind, we 
also enjoy indirect empirical access to the inadequacy of some aesthetic judgements, 
namely those which fail to be grounded in the proper recognition of the relevant 
non-aesthetic features of the artwork at issue. By empirically finding out that someone 
is visually impaired or blind (and does not use prosthetic tools), we can disqualify his 
or her aesthetic judgements about visual art from the start.11
For our current purposes, these cases are not of great interest, however, since they 
concern the adequacy of non-aesthetic judgements, and only very indirectly that 
of aesthetic judgements. What we should look at instead are the normal or suitable 
conditions for the transition from the recognition of non-aesthetic features to the 
judgemental ascription of aesthetic properties. Even assuming that the subject has 
no problems perceiving or otherwise discerning the non-aesthetic features of an art-
work, there are many ways—especially concerning the subject’s cognitive and evalua-
tive capacities—in which the conditions may fail to be normal or suitable for aesthetic 
judgement. Among other things, the subject may be partial or unsuitably influenced 
by non-aesthetic evaluations, lack sufficient experience with or knowledge of art, or be 
insensitive to which properties of artworks constitute aesthetic defects or merits or are 
otherwise aesthetically relevant (see Hume 1757/2008 and Goldman 1995).
The problem with this strategy is, however, that empirical investigations do not have 
the resources to recognize these possible sources of error for what they are. Empirical 
studies may inform us about the personal or subpersonal factors that influence our 
 11 I am grateful to two anonymous referees for pointing out this option. Note, however, there is still the 
issue of whether the fact that the proper aesthetic appreciation of paintings, say, requires access to their vis-
ible properties, and not to their tactile or olfactory properties, is empirically accessible. This would be the 
case if facts like these are due to conventions. But if they are instead due to the fact that looking at paintings 
provides us with an aesthetically more valuable experience than touching or smelling them, they would 
resist empirical detection, at least in a third-personal way.
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aesthetic judgements over and above our experience and understanding of the art-
works in question (see section 4.4). They may also determine the scope of our past 
exposure to and expertise in art. And they may tell us which aesthetic or non-aesthetic 
properties of artworks we take to contribute to aesthetic worth in a positive or negative 
way. But they cannot help us to decide whether any of these facts indicates the actual 
occurrence of an error in judgement. That is, empirical evidence may enable us to cor-
rectly describe the actual conditions under which we form our aesthetic judgements, 
but not to settle the issue of whether these conditions fail to be normal or suitable in 
any respect.
To start with, that we do not identify certain features as aesthetically relevant (or 
irrelevant) does not entail that we should have identified them as such. For the latter 
issue depends on which features are in fact realizers of aesthetic value and, relatedly, 
reasons for aesthetic evaluation. But which aesthetic contribution a given feature has 
as a realizer or reason is a matter both of its default tendency and of its interaction with 
the other aesthetically relevant features. And, as argued above, empirical investiga-
tions cannot reveal which features are realizers or reasons, or in which way and to 
which extent they contribute to a particular instance of aesthetic value. Accordingly, 
whether a subject is mistaken about the positive or negative aesthetic contribution of a 
given feature is not open to empirical study.
Similarly, whether a subject is lacking in experience or knowledge depends on 
which features and interactions need to be recognized. While the recognition of the 
aesthetic relevance of some features may not presuppose much prior engagement with 
art, other cases may require extensive expertise to be properly identified and under-
stood. Hence, the determination of whether a critic is sufficiently equipped to form a 
proper aesthetic judgement of a given artwork requires, again, the prior determination 
of which features of the artwork are aesthetically relevant as realizers or reasons—a 
task for which there are, as shown above, no empirical means.
The same line of reasoning applies to the issue of adjudging whether empirically 
detected influences on our aesthetic judgements are unproblematic from an aesthetic 
point of view, or whether they instead give rise to undue biases. We can acquire empiri-
cal evidence for the presence of such influences, but not for the beneficial, neutral, or 
detrimental nature of their impact on aesthetic appreciation. As a result, while empiri-
cal evidence may tell us how we respond aesthetically to artworks, it cannot tell us 
which of our aesthetic judgements are adequate, and which not. (E2) should therefore 
be rejected.
4.4 Grounding Aesthetic Scepticism: (E3)
The conclusion so far has been that third-personal empirical evidence is generally una-
ble to justify both first-order and higher-order aesthetic judgements. It cannot serve as 
non-inferential or inferential ground of the former; and it cannot distinguish between 
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adequate and inadequate instances of the latter. But there is still the possibility that 
empirical evidence may be able to cast doubt on our general trustworthiness as aesthetic 
critics—in particular, if aesthetic rationalism should indeed be assumed to be the best 
account of aesthetic appreciation. Indeed, recent psychological studies have shown that 
we are often much more irrational in our aesthetic responses than we think, and that we 
let ourselves be influenced in our aesthetic judgements by factors that should not really 
play a role in aesthetic appreciation, at least not according to aesthetic rationalism.
In what follows, I discuss whether these empirical results suffice to establish some 
form of scepticism about our capacity for aesthetic judgement—that is, whether they 
require us to refrain from forming aesthetic judgements. A positive answer would be 
tantamount to the truth of (E3). More specifically, I consider two forms of aesthetic 
scepticism that are modelled, respectively, on the example of fake barn country and on 
the problem of pessimistic induction (and, in a footnote, mention a third modelled on 
Cartesian scepticism about perceptual belief).
4.4.1 Kieran’s Sceptical Challenge
My starting point is the sceptical challenge for traditional accounts of aesthetic appre-
ciation (including aesthetic rationalism) that Matthew Kieran raised in a recent article:
The challenge which snobbery poses to aesthetic justification and knowledge-claims is funda-
mental. It seems that if we are judging or responding snobbishly, then we lack internal justifica-
tion for aesthetic claims, and we are not in a legitimate position to claim aesthetic knowledge. 
Furthermore, in the aesthetic realm snobbery is pervasive, much more so than we tend to pre-
sume, and moreover it is very difficult for us to tell whether we or others are being snobbish. 
The conjunction of these propositions gives rise to the following claim: for any given aesthetic 
response or judgement, we do not know whether it is justified, nor whether we can legitimately 
claim that things are as it lays down. If this is the epistemic situation we are in, the reasonable 
course of action seems to be to withdraw aesthetic claims. (Kieran 2010: 10)
In this passage, as well as in most parts of his article, Kieran concentrates on aesthetic 
responses that are biased due to snobbery—that is, due to the typically unacknowl-
edged desire to appear or feel superior relative to a certain group of people. But his con-
siderations and conclusion apply equally well to aesthetic judgements that are biased 
for reasons other than snobbery, such as subconscious framing or exposure effects. It 
is therefore possible to abstract from the specific case of snobbery and consider the 
epistemological consequences of biased aesthetic judgements more generally. Of most 
interest are thereby judgements that are unduly biased in virtue of some subpersonal 
factors, such that their bias cannot be discovered by means of introspection or normal 
observation of behaviour. Kieran identifies three crucial features of such judgements:
    (i) They lack justification and do not constitute knowledge.
  (ii) They are, on the personal level, indistinguishable from unbiased aesthetic 
judgements (because the kind of bias concerned is due to subpersonal factors).
 (iii) They are actually ubiquitous (i.e., high in number among all aesthetic judgements).
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Empirical studies are important with respect to aesthetic appreciation in so far as they 
make us aware of the features (ii) and (iii) and, hence, of the pervasiveness of undue 
biases that are inaccessible on the personal level. On the one hand, they inform us that 
there actually are aesthetic judgements that are biased in virtue of some subpersonal 
influences. And, on the other hand, they tell us that the number of such judgements 
is in fact relatively high in comparison with the total number of aesthetic judgements 
made. Even the aesthetic verdicts of experts have been shown not to be immune to 
the unnoticed distorting influence of aesthetically irrelevant factors, such as finan-
cial value or social standing (see, e.g., Brochet 2001; see also Cutting 2006). Indeed, 
without empirical research, these distortions of our opinions would largely remain 
unknown to us. We cannot find out by means of introspection or by listening to other 
people whether our or their aesthetic views involve cognitive biases due to the sub-
conscious influence of aesthetically irrelevant factors. This is why—to repeat a phrase 
from Kieran’s quote—‘it is very difficult for us to tell whether we or others are [biased]’ 
in aesthetic judgements: knowledge of such biases is often unattainable without proper 
scientific investigation.
Now, Kieran’s main suggestion in the quoted passage is that the three features (i)–
(iii) taken together give rise to the sceptical conclusion that we should withhold aes-
thetic judgement.12 The central thought is that we should refrain from judgements of a 
certain kind if a high number of judgements concerned actually lack good epistemic 
standing. This is, for instance, what would arguably be the case if we were to move to 
fake barn country. Because of the high number of fakes, we would unlearn how to 
visually discriminate genuine barns and would thus lose our capacity to form justified 
and knowledgeable perceptual judgements about the presence of such barns. As a con-
sequence, we should stop forming the judgement that there is a real barn whenever it 
visually seems to us as if there is one present in our environment—at least as long as we 
remain in fake barn country.
The starting point of the parallel sceptical argument in the aesthetic case is the 
assumption that our circumstances are such that many of our aesthetic responses end 
 12 The sceptical conclusion may also be supported in a different way, which relies solely on features (i) and 
(ii), but makes the further assumption that if we are unable to assure ourselves or others of the good epis-
temic standing of judgements of a certain kind, we are required to refrain from forming or trusting those 
judgements. What (i) and (ii) imply is that we cannot distinguish epistemically bad (i.e., biased) from epis-
temically good (i.e., unbiased) aesthetic judgements, at least on the personal level. But if we are unable to 
tell whether aesthetic judgements are of good or bad epistemic standing, we should better distrust them 
(unless we have, in particular cases, subpersonal evidence for the absence of any relevant bias). However, 
this Cartesian-style argument fails because the indistinguishability relation involved in feature (ii) is asym-
metric:  that we mistake biased judgements for unbiased ones does not mean that we mistake unbiased 
judgements for biased ones—we take both to be unbiased and, hence, to be justified or even instances of 
knowledge (see, e.g., McDowell 1986, Williamson 1990, Martin 2006, Dorsch 2010b, and Dorsch 2013). 
Accordingly, the sceptic is wrong about the extension of the sceptical conclusion from biased to unbiased 
aesthetic judgements: our inability to distinguish unbiased aesthetic judgements from biased ones does not 
entail that we cannot recognize the unbiased judgements for what they are. But, without this extension, the 
sceptical conclusion would remain completely uninteresting, given that it is trivially true that we should 
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up being distorted by factors external to conscious experience (such as framing effects 
or subconsciously effective desires), while only a few remain unaffected and adequate. 
Just like in the example of fake barn country, we arguably lose our ability to recognize 
aesthetic qualities and values under these conditions, even in cases where our aesthetic 
judgements are actually unbiased. We may still veridically take objects to have certain 
aesthetic properties, but our resulting beliefs that they possess those properties remain 
unjustified because their truth is too accidental—it is pure luck that our responses 
are unbiased and not skewed by aesthetically irrelevant factors. As a consequence, we 
should cease to form aesthetic judgements—at least once we have become aware of the 
omnipresence of the distortions. In short, given that we seem to end up with biased 
aesthetic opinions much more often than not, we should better stop coming up with 
such opinions in the first place.
Perhaps this description of our epistemic situation is too pessimistic, and perhaps 
the empirical results do not really support the rather strong claim that only a few of our 
aesthetic judgements are unbiased. There are difficult issues here concerning how fre-
quently, and in which actual or counterfactual circumstances, we have to be wrong in 
order to count as unreliable judges. But let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the 
description provided is indeed accurate and can be backed up empirically. Even then, 
our epistemic situation does not suffice to warrant the adoption of the kind of scepti-
cism about aesthetic judgements outlined, at least not in the long run. It is true that 
we should hold back momentarily from making aesthetic judgements, as long as most 
of our responses are bound to be distorted. But we can certainly reduce the number 
of our biased aesthetic judgements and thus regain our ability to recognize aesthetic 
properties to a considerable extent—just as we may start to look at what seem to be 
barns from different angles and thereby regain our capacity to visually tell apart genu-
ine barns from fake ones.
Once we are aware of the fact, say, that we tend to value artworks more the more we 
are confronted with them, we can actively counter this effect—for instance, by increas-
ing and balancing our exposure to the different artworks that we want to assess or com-
pare.13 Similarly, once we realize that we are aesthetic snobs, we can actively go against 
our tendency to care about our social status when appreciating art—for instance, by 
learning, or forcing ourselves, to ignore our social status, or what others think about 
us; or by making a point of giving weight and expression to unpopular opinions. So, 
by means of careful actions, we may be able to ensure that our aesthetic judgements 
avoid forming biased aesthetic judgements. In any case, Kieran does not endorse this way of arguing for the 
sceptical conclusion, as illustrated by his insistence on the importance of feature (iii), that is, the prevalence 
of bias in aesthetic matters.
 13 This might not work if there were no upper limit to the exposure effect, or if high exposure would sys-
tematically lead to too high an evaluation. But there is yet no reason to assume that, if we just look long 
enough at our own drawings, we will eventually find them to be better than Matisse’s; or that spending years 
in a room with a reproduction of some mediocre painting will lead us to overestimate the aesthetic value of 
the original.
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are unbiased more of the time than not. Our opinions would perhaps continue to be 
subject to the subconscious force of the aesthetically irrelevant external factors. But 
there is no reason to assume that this force cannot be neutralized or outweighed by the 
impact of our actions.14
4.4.2 Pessimistic induction
The sceptic might still insist that we should be rather pessimistic about our ability to 
do better in the future. Our aesthetic judgements were largely distorted in the past; 
they are still so in the present; so how could we seriously expect them to improve in 
the future? This piece of reasoning resembles the so-called pessimistic (meta-)induc-
tion in the philosophy of science (see, e.g., Chakravartty 2007: ch. 2.4, Psillos 1996, 
and Doppelt 2007). The history of science consists of a long and ordered sequence of 
theories, each of which has been empirically refuted at a certain moment in time and 
been replaced by a successor theory. So how could we hope that the currently endorsed 
theories—that is, those theories at the end of the series that have not yet been dis-
proven—will fare any better than any of their predecessors? Enumerative induction 
seems to show that all human attempts at formulating a correct scientific theory are 
destined to fail—which is why we perhaps should stop taking any of our scientific the-
ories to be (approximately) true (which need not mean, however, that we should also 
stop making practical use of them). Perhaps something similar is true of our attempts 
at forming aesthetic judgements?
But the answer should be negative. Apart from general objections to the soundness 
of pessimistic induction arguments (Chakravartty 2007: ch. 2.4; Psillos 1996; Doppelt 
2007), this sceptical strategy does not really apply to the aesthetic case, given that we 
have no evidence that all of our aesthetic judgements so far have been biased. But, with 
some of them having been unbiased, there is no inductive basis to infer that our future 
aesthetic judgements will be biased. Indeed, we can expect our aesthetic judgements 
to improve in the future precisely because we already start off with a (small) basis of 
adequate aesthetic judgements and, furthermore, because we have gained knowledge 
about some of the distorting factors and are able to use this knowledge in order to 
counter their negative influence.
4.4.3 The social dimension of aesthetic appreciation
To conclude, neither of the sceptical challenges is successful in its attempt to estab-
lish the conclusion that we should refrain from forming aesthetic judgements. There 
is therefore no good reason to accept (E3). Perhaps future evidence will show that we 
 14 This proposal is perfectly compatible with the kind of aesthetic virtue theory defended by Kieran (2010). 
Indeed, it may actually be aesthetically virtuous to try to counter the hidden biases of one’s aesthetic judge-
ments. Moreover, aesthetic rationalism can certainly be combined with such a virtue-theoretical approach, 
given that our capacity to discriminate and respond to reasons may very well be a matter of virtue and char-
acter (see McDowell 1979).
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cannot fail to be biased when forming aesthetic judgements and that there is no room 
at all for improvement in this matter. But as long as this is not the case, (E3) should be 
rejected—even in the light of empirical tests indicating that bias in aesthetic judge-
ments is indeed widespread. Nonetheless, the comparison with the case of science is 
instructive in two respects.
First, it shows that there need not be anything wrong epistemically or pragmatically 
in continuing to form judgements of a certain kind, despite knowing that many—or 
even all—past instances of that kind have been deficient in one way or another. Just 
as there are good reasons to think that the pessimistic induction does not force us to 
refrain from believing in new and not yet falsified scientific theories, there are good 
reasons to think that the empirically detected pervasiveness of bias does not force us to 
refrain from acquiring aesthetic beliefs.
Second, the comparison demonstrates that our first-personal evidence is not the 
only kind of evidence that may require us to question or correct our aesthetic judge-
ments:  the third-personal evidence delivered by the sciences may play this role as 
well. Although such third-personal evidence cannot tell us which aesthetic properties 
to ascribe to which objects, or which of our aesthetic responses are adequate, it can 
inform us about the presence of undue biases. In a similar vein, the differing aesthetic 
opinions of others, who are generally trustworthy critics and not obviously at fault in 
the particular cases concerned, give us reason to critically return to our own views. As 
a consequence, the still widely held view that our own first-personal experience enjoys 
special authority for us in aesthetic matters (see, e.g., Budd 1996: ch. 1, Hopkins 2010, 
and Kieran 2010) comes under threat: this authority may very well be undermined 
in particular instances by third-personal evidence, or by testimonially transmitted 
first-personal evidence.
What this second point furthermore suggests is that aesthetic criticism should be 
understood as a genuinely social endeavour, not dissimilar to that of the sciences. Just 
as scientists depend on their interaction with each other to progress with their theo-
ries, the best critics are those who aim to improve their aesthetic judgements partly in 
response to evidence that is not first-personal, or not their own. This is, for instance, 
why we should take into account, when assessing the value of an artwork, the testi-
mony of others, as well as how it was treated in the past. In particular, that an artwork 
has survived the so-called ‘test of time’ may be a good reason for ascribing a high aes-
thetic value to it (see Hume 1757/2008 and Savile 1982).
At this point, it should be noted that whether an artwork satisfies this test cannot be 
decided empirically. As Savile has convincingly argued, a given artwork should count 
as having survived the test of time ‘if over a sufficiently long period it survives in our 
attention under an appropriate interpretation in a sufficiently embedded way’ (Savile 
1982: 259; see also Hume 1757/2008). Accordingly, what matters is not mere survival, 
but whether the work in question (or a copy of it) has survived in virtue of the aes-
thetic appreciation of sufficiently experienced critics with an adequate understand-
ing of the work. But, for the reasons given earlier, we cannot determine the adequacy 
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of experience and understanding involved in (past or present) aesthetic opinions by 
empirical means. Since even a large number of people could err in aesthetic matters, 
the empirical discovery of the purely descriptive fact that a given artwork has been 
preserved and continuously appreciated over a long period of time is not enough to 
support the normative conclusion that the work possesses aesthetic worth.
At best, the empirically gained insight that many people from different times were 
(rightly or wrongly) appreciative of the artwork and tried to do their best to prevent 
it from being destroyed or forgotten may give us reason to consider the work more 
closely and to review our opinion, especially when we do not yet value the work as 
highly as critics did in the past. Having previously failed to appreciate Homer’s Odyssey, 
the realization of what it really means for it to have survived and been admired during 
all those centuries should move us to re-examine its aesthetic quality and may perhaps 
help us to recognize its proper worth.
4.5 Conclusion: Aesthetic Rationalism
The preceding considerations have argued that the relevance of third-personal empiri-
cal evidence for aesthetic appreciation is rather limited.
That most aesthetic properties are response-dependent and, especially, normative 
means that they are not open to measurement. And the very specific and holistic char-
acter of the contribution of aesthetic and non-aesthetic features to the realization of 
(other) aesthetic properties, as well as to the rationalization of the corresponding aes-
thetic judgements, means that we do not have empirical access to aesthetic principles 
that could be meaningfully used as premises in inferences to aesthetic conclusions. 
This—together with the fact that our experiential or emotional access to aesthetic 
properties and their non-aesthetic realization is very restricted too (see Dorsch 2007 
and 2014)—is why the truth of (E1) should be denied: empirical evidence cannot pro-
vide any non-inferential or inferential justification for aesthetic judgements.
The specification of which of our aesthetic judgements are adequate, on the other 
hand, amounts to the determination of which of them have been formed under con-
ditions suitable for aesthetic judgement—and, notably, by a sufficiently experienced, 
knowledgeable, discerning, and attentive critic. But assessing the quality of an aes-
thetic judge presupposes that we have some prior grasp of the aesthetically relevant 
non-aesthetic features of the artworks concerned and of their concrete contribution 
to the realization of the aesthetic qualities and values of those works—something 
which empirical evidence cannot deliver, as concluded before. (E2) should therefore 
be rejected as well.
Finally, while empirical studies reveal that many of our aesthetic judgements are 
actually biased in inappropriate ways, this does not yet suffice to establish the sceptical 
conclusion that we should avoid making any aesthetic judgements. Indeed, instead 
of ruling out any possibility of progress or improvement, the empirical investiga-
tions concerned may in fact help us to better or refine our critical capacities and to 
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make progress in our aesthetic understanding and evaluation of art. Accordingly, (E3) 
remains so far unsupported.
The refutation of these three central claims of aesthetic empiricism leads naturally 
to the endorsement of aesthetic rationalism. In particular, aesthetic rationalism pro-
vides us with a better explanation of how we actually do recognize aesthetic properties 
and their non-aesthetic realizers (if not by empirical means). The idea is that the best 
method for the recognition of many aesthetic qualities, and more or less all aesthetic 
values, is to engage in reasoning and to discriminate between those underlying fea-
tures that help to make sense of the ascription of aesthetic properties, and those that 
do not. For instance, on the basis of noticing that the elegance of an outline drawing 
of a face speaks strongly in favour of a positive evaluation, while its overemphasized 
realism supports a slightly negative assessment, it may be reasonable to judge that the 
drawing is somewhat beautiful.
The underlying assumption is that only realizers of aesthetic value can figure as aes-
thetic reasons, that is, as features in terms of which we can explain the presence of 
aesthetic value. Of course, there are likely to be many realizers—especially lower-level 
ones—that we are unable to recognize as reasons. But we can still identify them as 
realizers of aesthetic value in a more indirect fashion, namely by identifying them as 
realizers of aesthetic reasons. We recognize that the saturation of the colour patches of 
a painting, say, are partly responsible for its lack of aesthetic worth because we notice 
that they engender the garishness of the painting, and because we recognize this gar-
ishness as an aesthetic defect that outweighs all present merits. The epistemology of 
aesthetic realizers is therefore, to a significant extent, an epistemology of aesthetic 
reasons.
Although aesthetic reasoning surely relies in part on the conceptual and default 
principles introduced above, it is also to be expected that quite a lot of the rational bal-
ancing involvement happens without the help of any principles—not the least because 
there may not be any principles which tell us how various default merits and defects 
interact with each other in their joint realization of aesthetic value.15 But this is unprob-
lematic since there is no reason to assume that all or even much of aesthetic reasoning 
proceeds deductively, or involves inductive or abductive forms of principle-governed 
inference.
Consider the analogous case of judging the number of participants in a protest 
march who gather in a square that we overlook from an elevated position. We may per-
haps be able to start with the knowledge that their number is higher than one hundred, 
and lower than one thousand—perhaps because experience has told us that the square 
offers space for maximally about one thousand people, and because we see that more 
than a tenth of the square is filled. For a more precise informed guess, however, we have 
to rely on our various impressions of the mass of people in front of us (e.g., when we 
 15 See Bergqvist’s (2010) and Kirwin’s (2011) discussion of whether Sibley assumed such principles to be 
available or not.
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look at it from different angles), without the need for, or availability of, relevant princi-
ples. Something very similar may happen when we experience an artwork and come to 
know its aesthetic worth by considering the rational force of its features. Our different 
impressions pull us in different directions, and we begin to weigh them against each 
other. But reaching an equilibrium among them does not presuppose reliance on prin-
ciples linking the merit- or defect-constituting features to the respective value.
Although the resulting picture of aesthetic evaluation is rationalistic in character, it 
leaves significant room for third-personal empirical evidence. In addition to its role as 
a general corrective (e.g., when it uncovers hidden biases in our judgements), the evi-
dence delivered by empirical studies may help us to discover some of the non-aesthetic 
properties of an artwork that are central to the realization of its aesthetic nature (with-
out, of course, thereby identifying those properties as realizers or reasons). That is, 
some of the premises on which our aesthetic reasoning is based may be justifiedly 
believed by us because they are the conclusions of empirical investigations. But this 
does not render the inferential justification of the resulting aesthetic judgements 
empirical, given that the inference involved is not guided by—that is, does not involve 
as premises—principles that are gained by third-personal empirical means. For either 
the reasoning proceeds in unprincipled ways, or it involves general premises that con-
cern conceptual or normative links between aesthetic or non-aesthetic properties. In 
particular, both default principles (e.g., that elegant works are, by default, beautiful) 
and rational principles (e.g., that it makes (most) sense to ascribe sublimity to a work 
with those non-aesthetic and lower-level aesthetic properties) cannot be established 
empirically, but require our rational capacities for their discovery.
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